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1 Introduction 
An interesting fact to consider is that in all European and most non-European countries, there are 
subsidies directed at rail passenger services irrespective of organisational form. This fact may lead to 
the question whether this has a rationale from welfare point of view. 
One part of this paper is general in character, discussing the possible arguments for rail subsidies. The 
other part uses Sweden as a case study for simulations of the possible effects of one type of subsidy 
scheme, without and with supposed response from coach and airline operators. 
During the last five years a number of new policy measures affected the Swedish rail industry. In 
1989 the Swedish national state-owned railway, SJ, was separated into a national state-owned, 
socially oriented, rail track authority (Banverket, BV) and a state-owned, commercially oriented 
operator, also called SJ. The Swedish air industry was fully deregulated on January 1st 1992. On 1st 
of January 1993 the Swedish coach industry was partially deregulated and from 1999 it was fully 
deregulated. These policy changes led to increased competition between long-distance public 
transport modes. However, the Swedish Railways, SJ, still has a monopoly for long-distance 
passenger transport. The consequence of the Swedish partial deregulation of the coach industry has 
been a small increase in coach service supply which mainly has favoured the less affluent travellers, 
without affecting the railway significantly, neither the operator, SJ, nor the passengers. 
Section 2 includes a brief principal discussion of possible market failure arguments for political 
intervention in terms of railway subsidies. Section 3 analyses the consequences for price and 
frequency of one possible subsidy scheme. Section 4 includes the nation wide simulation analyses of 
price reductions assuming no response and response respectively from air and the assumed coach 
operations after deregulation in the year 1999. Conclusions are presented in section 5. 
The analysis and results presented here lean on unpublished research by the author in 1998 plus the 
first results of a new project financed by the Swedish Rail track Authority, BV, which commenced in 
May 1999 and which is due to be finished in mid 2001. 
Responsible for the paper is Kjell Jansson, Department of Economics, Stockholm University. 
2The simulation work has been done in co-operation with Mats Hansson, SL Konsult, a subsidiary to 
the Stockholm Public Transport Authority, SL. 
32 Theoretical discussion 
Most economic activities in market economies have relatively few regulations, apart from health 
control, anti-trust laws etc. W ith respect to rail passenger services we believe there may be three main 
rationales for political interventions, the second-best motive, economies of density in production and 
economies of density in production. 
2.1 The second-best argument 
There seems to be a wide consent among transport planners and economists (see e.g., The EC Green 
paper ”Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in the Transport Sector”) that heavy road vehicles, 
including coaches, and aircrafts pay less than the social marginal cost which depends on air 
contamination and climate gases. 
In such cases the common argument for public intervention, and probably the most commonly 
understood argument among politicians, is the "second-best argument".  The first-best solution, to 
price coach/air according to marginal social cost may not be politically accepted. In this case efficient 
pricing stipulates that the price of rail services should also be below marginal social cost, where the 
magnitude of the price marginal cost differential is dependent on market shares, rail own price 
elasticity and cross-price elasticities. (See for example Glaister (1974) and Jansson (1991) for more 
details).
2.2 Economies of density in consumption 
Mohring (1974) observed economies of density in consumption of public transport, which gives rise 
to a positive external effect.  Each additional passenger will benefit the already existing passengers 
through a higher optimal service frequency or a denser network. 
The consequence is that the optimal price equals the average operating cost minus the passenger 
benefit in terms of less frequency delay due to a one unit increase in frequency.  This is thus an 
argument for public intervention through part government financing. 
The optimal deficit may be estimated according to the following type of calculation according to 
Jansson (1991). Empirical studies show that the value of frequency delay, expressed in half the 
headway, is around SEK 40/h for private journeys. Assuming an average trip length of 400 km and 
headway of 1 hour this means that the deduction to arrive at social marginal cost is SEK 0.05/pass. 
km. (= 40/(2x1)/400). If the headway were 2 hours the deduction would be SEK 0.10/pass.km. These 
4values constitute between 8% and 16% of the average variable cost of 2nd class operation. 
Interestingly the fare structure employed by the Swedish rail operator SJ for various rail passengers 
segments means that the prices are more or less proportionate to each respective segments value of 
time. For this reason this magnitude of optimal deficit is approximately valid for all passenger groups, 
as long as no budget constraint is taken into account, that is as long as no price discrimination based 
on elasticities is considered.  
2.3 Economies of density in production 
Where a passenger transport operator enjoys an increase in demand there are three ways to react. One 
is not to increase the supply, but let the passengers perceive a higher degree of in-vehicle crowding. 
The other two ways mean to expand the capacity, by increasing either the number of departures or the 
size of the unit. For coaches the latter possibility is not very large, since road regulations set the limit 
of the vehicle. For air- and rail industries a size increase is possible. 
For both rail- and airline operations we have used available, but unfortunately vague, information on 
the cost structure of various aircrafts, trains and train carriages (during the course of the project we 
will try to obtain more information and all contributions are welcome). The outcome is the following. 
Assuming a 50% average load on the Swedish high speed trains X2000, the average variable cost per 
departure is calculated to be around SEK 0.80/km. For ordinary Intercity trains, assuming a 25% 
average load, the average variable cost per departure is calculated to be around SEK 0.60/km. These 
costs thus refer to the marginal cost per passenger if the frequency is changed. 
The corresponding marginal cost per passenger of one more carriage is calculated to be around 0.50 
for X2000 and 0.30 for InterCity trains. 
For airline operation corresponding calculations demonstrate a similar relationship between average 
variable cost and social marginal cost. The difference between air and rail services is, however, that 
airlines already apply tourist class prices that are close to social marginal cost. The reason is that the 
cost per passenger kilometre of airline operation is higher than the cost of rail operation. The 
consequence is that the percentage of full fare (business or 1st class) passengers compared to 
”ordinary” travellers is much higher for airlines than for rail operators. Where both operators have a 
budget constraint, it is thus much easier for the airline to apply price discrimination in order to meet 
the budget constraint and fill the aircraft than it is for the rail operator to meet the constraint and fill 
the train.  
5With respect to coaches the marginal cost is very close to average cost since there is little scope too 
increase the size of the vehicle.  
3 One way to subsidise the railway 
3.1 Assumptions 
Irrespective of how the marginal cost is calculated we may conclude from section 2 that the marginal 
social cost is well below the average variable cost for the Swedish railways, mainly due to economies 
of density in production and less so due to economies of density in consumption. In this section we 
will employ a simple model in order to analyse whether one form of subsidy, a grant related to the 
price charged, is welfare improving 
The cost is expressed as follows 
where X is demand per hour, F is frequency and CF is cost per departure. 
Revenue, R, is: 
where X is a function of the generalised cost. 
Generalised cost is: 
where P is price, T is riding time cost ,Tv is wait time cost. The latter can also be expressed as T/2F,
where T is the value of wait time, assuming that the wait time is half the interval, 1/2F. 
The cost for riding time in detail is: 
where J is the value of ride time as a function of in-vehicle crowding, where V is the number of seats 
in the vehicle. 
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63.2 Optimisation without subsidies 
The objective function of the profit maximising operator: 
The objective function of the welfare maximising authority: 
3.2.1 Price optimisation 
The profit maximising operator determines the price according to: 
Since G/P = 1, we achieve: 
or, by use of the price elasticity, HP:
The price chosen for each passenger group thus depends on its price elasticity and the cost recovery 
constraint, which typically means price at least equal to average cost. 
3.2.2 W elfare maximisation 
The welfare maximising authority determines price according to: 
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7which yields: 
The socially optimal price equals the marginal cost of the operator plus the negative external effects 
borne by other passengers through more in-vehicle crowding. 
The expressions for optimal price do not tell whether profit or welfare maximisation yields the highest 
price. For this question we have to turn to the first-order conditions for optimal frequency. 
3.2.3 Frequency optimisation 
The profit maximising operator determines optimal frequency according to: 
(12) yields: 
The welfare maximising authority determines optimal frequency according to: 
A welfare maximising authority thus does not only take into account the effects on marginal costs and 
marginal demand with respect to frequency (second and third terms), but also the direct marginal 
effect on generalised cost with respect to a frequency change (first term). The optimal price is then: 
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8Expression (15) can be rewritten in several ways, for example as: 
This means that the optimal price equals the average cost minus the value of wait time (see for 
example Jansson (1991) for further analysis). 
3.2.4 Optimal pricing according to optimal frequency 
From expressions (12) and  (14) we get: 
The first term is negative since the average number of passengers is reasonably higher than the 
marginal demand increase of the frequency increase. The first term, which reflects the marginal in-
vehicle crowding effect, also has a higher absolute value that is smaller than that of the second term, 
which reflects the marginal value of reduction of frequency delay. All in all, we can conclude that the 
expression can be approximated with one which is inversely proportional to the squared value of 
frequency, an expression we can denote D/F2.
Profit maximisation 
Expression (12) can be rewritten as: 
This yields: 
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9Welfare maximisation 
Correspondingly we achieve: 
From (19) and (20) we can conclude that the optimal frequency is higher for welfare than for profit 
maximisation. The reason is that the first term in the nominator reflects the value to the existing 
passengers of increased frequency. 
3.3 Introduction of a subsidy 
We assume a subsidy as part, s, in addition to the price, P. The objective function of the operator is 
then:
where the last term reflects the governments restriction with respect to the maximum amount of 
subsidy, K. 
Price optimisation 
The profit maximising operator determine the price according to: 
This yields: 
Since the shadow price of public funds normally is around 0.2-0.4, the subsidy s will imply a price 
reduction compared to the situation without the subsidy. Where there are several passenger groups, 
the profit maximising firm will put a higher price for groups with low price elasticity compared to the 
price for groups with high price elasticity. 
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Frequency optimisation 
The next question is how the subsidy will affect the optimal frequency. Expression (12) now 
becomes: 
 (24) can be rewritten as: 
This yields: 
Since 1+s-Os >0, the frequency will be higher with than without the subsidy. 
We have thus found that a subsidy as part of the price imply a price cut and a frequency increase, that 
is, the move is in the direction towards the welfare optimum. We can, however, say nothing bout the 
magnitude from this theoretical analysis. One effort to quantify is done in the case study for the 
Swedish railway in the next section.  
4 Simulations of rail subsidies in Sweden 
4.1 Introduction  
Nash and Preston (1990) have made an empirical study of costs revenues and productivity of railways 
in 13 European countries. The study shows that SJ and Banverket (the Rail Track Authority) had the 
next highest productivity, after the Netherlands, measured in train kilometres per employee (NS: 4 
484, SJ: 3 501), and the second highest cost coverage, after British Rail, BR (BR: 0,82, SJ: 0,59). 
Nevertheless, the Swedish railway operator SJ has financial problems. Would subsidies be welfare 
improving? We investigate the issue by use of simulations. 
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We assume here that the state subsidises only 2nd class rail fares so that the price is reduced by 20%, 
i.e., for budget reasons the state encourages price discrimination, since 1st class passengers (assumed 
to be business trips) are less price sensitive. 
The arguments for lower rail prices may be further enhanced by coach deregulation. The reason is that 
one may then avoid certain rail supply reductions which otherwise could be socially undesirable. We 
will thus take into account that the Swedish deregulation of coach services may affect the situation. 
For this reason we will base our analysis on a future base situation for which it is assumed that the 
coach supply has increased and that SJ has responded by selective price cuts on lines that will lose 
patronage. This base situation has been analysed and defined in K Jansson (1998a).  
The price reduction analysis will be done in two steps. First we assume that SJ reduces all 2nd class 
fares, on the basis that they have already made the selective price cuts, but given that the air and coach 
operators do not respond. In the second step we analyse the outcome given that the air and coach 
operators reduce their supply in proportion to their demand loss on each specific route. For the second 
step we describe the outcome in terms of change in: the various traveller groups’ surplus, the various 
operators surplus, external effects, State revenue, excess burden, and welfare. 
It must be observed that the results presented are based on calculations that are influenced by a 
number of sources of uncertainty, even if this for convenience is not everywhere explicitly 
underlined. 
4.2 Basic prerequisites and assumptions for simulations 
In the analysis we regard the passenger transports as a system, where passengers can choose among 
lines and operators and where a single journey may involve several lines and operators. 
We assume that: a) Operators compete independently, without regarding modes as being 
complementary, b) Passengers regard the modes as alternatives, but also as being complementary, c) 
Passengers are not homogenous, but have different preferences and face different prices. 
Both for the simulation of choice of route and mode and for the calculations of consumer benefits we 
assume that passengers minimise their generalised cost per journey, that is price plus weighted travel 
time converted into monetary units. 
The network we have used for the simulations is comprised of the Swedish air-, rail-,  
regional bus-, ferry and coach lines, plus the national road network. 
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We categorise the passengers in different approximately homogenous groups, each with a separate 
monetary value of time per mode and each meeting a specific price per mode, taking into account an 
assumed discount per group and that that business travellers deduct VAT and corporate tax. We also 
take into account that each group may have different values of time for each specific mode due to 
comfort etc. See the table below. 
Table 4.1 Assumed time values and weights for the national network 
   Weight for Ride time weight 
 Share 
Trips 
Ride time 
value 
 (train) 
SEK/hour 
Wait 
time
Transfer  
and   
walk time
IC-
train 
X2000
(fast
train) 
Coach Air Car
>100 km journeys   
Private   
Private, 90 0.20 90 0.6 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.50 1.2-2.0 1.6
Private, 70 0.50 70 0.6 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.50  1.2-2.0 1.6
Students 0.15 25 0.5 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.20 1.2-2.0 1.6
Senior citizens 0.15 25 0.5 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.50 1.2-2.0 1.8
Business 1.00 220 1.2 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.50 1.2-2.0 1.6
100 km journeys  20 0.5 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.50 - 1.7
Note that the car time weight reflects the combination that car drivers and passengers usually take 
breaks during the journey and the fact that car driving may be perceived as less comfortable compared 
to train. The time values and the weights are derived from a Swedish stated preference study and from 
the calibration work. 
The assignment program used is the VIPS-system. The share of each mode (car, coach, rail, air), Pu,
and the composite waiting time, W, are calculated according to: 
where 
N is the number of services 
tu  is the interval of service u 
ti  is the interval of service i 
ru is the remaining travel time of service u 
ri is the remaining travel time of service i 
x is the time till departure of service u 
WT  i 1
N¦ 1
tu
x3
iz u
N
0
tu
³ (1 min 1,max x  tu  t iti ,0
­®¯
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For external effects we have used the official Swedish values according to the Swedish Institute for 
Transport and Communications analysis 
4.3 Reduced rail prices - with no response from air and coach  
Due to the limited space of this paper the results of this situation are presented in short form under the 
headings: Passengers and Operators. 
Passengers 
Since fare cuts are assumed to refer to 2nd class only and business travellers are assumed to use 1st 
class, business travellers are not affected at all. The two working groups benefit most in total, but 
students and senior citizens benefit more per trip. The benefit of short trip travellers is negligible per 
trip but quite substantial in total. Some groups benefit not only in terms of money but they also gain 
travel time, due to that train, which has become cheaper, is sometimes faster than the mode they used 
before. 
Operators 
Given that yet no concern has been taken to possible responses from air and coach operators, the 
railway is estimated to increase its demand by 31%, while airlines would lose 12% and coach 
operators 28%. 
4.4 Reduced rail prices - with responses from air and coach 
Here we assume that air and coach operators respond by reducing the service frequency on each line 
in proportion to the demand lost and that the SJ responds by increasing the service frequency on each 
route in proportion to the demand gained. The results are presented under the headings: Passengers, 
Operators, External effects and fuel taxes, State finances and excess burden, Welfare. 
We make the calculations under two assumptions: ”max” and ”min”. ”Min” means minimum shift to 
rail transport, for which case we have assumed that reduced rail fares attract coach and air passengers 
only, according to the simulation model, but no car travellers. ”Max” means maximum shift to rail 
transport, for which case we have assumed that reduced rail fares attract coach and air passengers but 
also car travellers, according to the simulation model.  
Passengers 
The increased frequency on some rail lines implies that most passenger groups gain both in terms of 
time and money, and this effect is thus stronger than the effect of reduced frequencies on some coach- 
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and airlines. See table 4.2 below. For the sum of consumer surpluses we also add a column for this 
sum assuming that all groups have the same value of time, something which may be regarded as the 
equality value of aggregate consumer surplus. If all passenger groups were given the same (average) 
value of time the total benefit is again much larger, since the groups who gain most have a relatively 
low value of time.  
Table 4.2 Calculated change in average generalised cost and total consumer surplus 
 (MSEK per year) distributed on travel categories. 
Consumer surplus, 
M SEK/year
Senior Short  
Business Working Working citizens Students trips Sum Sum 
 220 SEK/h 90 SEK/h 70 SEK/h 25 SEK/h 25 SEK/h 20 SEK/h different  equal 
 max max max max max max max min max min 
Consumer surplus 44 127 354 51 63 204 842 741 1458 1283
   of which time 6 22 -158 38 8 123 39 380 
   of which fare 38 105 512 13 55 81 803 361 
    
Generalised cost,  
SEK/trip 
 Senior Short  
Business Working Working citizens Students trips Sum  
 220 SEK/h 90 SEK/h 70 SEK/h 25 SEK/h 25 SEK/h 20 SEK/h  
Generalised cost 1,2 2,9 4,0 3,6 7,0 0,1 18,8 
   of which time 0,2 0,5 -1,8 2,7 0,9 0,1 2,5 
   of which fare 1,1 2,4 5,8 0,9 6,0 0,0 16,2 
Operators 
The railway is estimated to gain 19% and 43% new passengers respectively according to the ”min” 
and ”max” assumptions, while airlines would lose 21%, coaches 42% and regional buses 3%.  
For table 4.3 below we shall be aware that we have not included the state subsidy to the railway. The 
railway would thus be in a better situation than that shown in the table, and the state would lose the 
corresponding subsidy amount. For the cost-benefit analysis result inclusion of these transfers would 
make a very little change. Note also that for the max case no subsidies would be needed, something 
which indicates that the max assumption may not be realistic. The losses of airlines and coaches may 
be exaggerated since they may have means to reduce costs, which we are not aware of. 
Table 4.3 Calculated change in passenger kilometres and producer surplus per vehicle  categories 
and operators (in million SEK per year) 
Change in 
passenger 
km, 
million
Change in 
passenger 
km, 
%
Change in 
revenues 
MSEK/year
Change in 
costs
MSEK/year
Change in 
producer 
surplus 
MSEK/year
 max min max min max min max min max min
SJ 3131 1368 43 19 1806 117 1288 560 168 -313
Air -526 -526 -21 -21 -903 -903 -585 -585 -318 -318
Long-distance coaches -522 -522 -42 -42 -198 -198 -168 -168 -30 -30
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Regional buses -1175 -1175 -3 -3 -7 -7 0 0 -7 -7
Total public transport 1965 -855 13 -6 698 -991 885 -193 -187 -668
Car -1761 0 -3 0   
External effects and fuel taxes 
The increase in coach service supply and the reduction of car use mean that the external effects in 
total are reduced to some extent. However, the current low level of taxation of heavy vehicles also 
means that the total tax revenues would be reduced. This is thus an illustration of that external costs of 
heavy vehicles and coaches are not internalised. 
Table 4.4 Calculated change in vehicle km, external costs and tax revenues 
 Change in External Tax 
 vehicle km/year costs vehicle km
  MSEK/year MSEK/yea
r
 max min max min max min
Rail 6.8 3.0 38 17 26 11 
Air -6 -6 -66 -66 -25 -25 
Coaches -17 -17 -33 -33 -13 -13 
Regional buses 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total public transport -16 -20 -61 -82 -12 --26
Car -1174 0 -364 0 -411 0 
State finances and excess burden 
The change of the excess burden is assumed to be 30% of the net state financial outcome. The net 
effect on the state revenues would then be -556 MSEK for the max case and -261 MSEK for the min 
case. The corresponding values for excess burden are - 167 MSEK for max and - 78 MSEK for min. 
Welfare 
Here we sum consumer surplus, producer surplus, government surplus, excess burden and external 
effects. The net social benefit seems to be positive, even if very small for the ”min” case where 
different values of time are used. We shall though bear in mind that the cost savings of the airlines 
may be much larger than what we have assumed. The net benefit is therefore probably higher. We can 
however be quite certain that the net social benefit is much larger than the financial loss of the 
railway. This depends on economies of density in rail operation, i.e., that more passengers can be 
accommodated at a low marginal cost. 
Table 4.5 Welfare effects (MSEK/year). 
Different values Equal value
MSEK/year MSEK/year
 max min max min
Consumer surplus 842 741 1458 1283
   of which travel time 39 380 - -
   of which fare 803 361 - -
Producer surplus -131 -468 -131 -468
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Government surplus -556 -261 -556 -261
Excess burden -167 -78 -167 -78
External effects 453 131 453 131
Net social benefit 441 65 1057 607
5 Conclusions 
This tentative study indicates, both through theoretical analysis and by use of simulations, that 
subsidisation of the railway is worth to consider. We must be aware, however, that this result is based 
on the present organisation and subsidy scheme of the railway. We cannot know, for example, 
whether the current subsidies of rail access charges and the subsidies assumed in this paper is an 
optimal combination.  
It is concluded to be worthwhile to analyse rail pricing in more detail than what has been possible in 
this small study. Important research issues during the course of the new project financed by the 
Swedish Rail Track Authority, BV are: 
 The joint concern for and the optimal combination of rail access charges and passenger fares, 
 How optimal access charges and fares may be affected by organisational form, that is vertical vs. 
horizontal integration and private vs. public ownership. 
 Estimation of total costs, average variable costs and social marginal costs, in order to find the 
optimal level of subsidy, 
 Compare various forms of subsidy: lump sum, reduced access charges, contributions linked to 
passengers etc.  
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